Reform UK - Public spending
Raise defence spending to 3% of GDP
Increase defence spending beyond the 2.5% path, reaching 3% of GDP within six years.
Last updated: May 2026.
GDP benchmark
Reform's 2024 Contract proposed 2.5% of GDP by year three and 3% within six years. Current UK policy already targets 2.5% by 2027.
- Current policy targets 2.5% by 2027.
- Reform target reaches 3% within six years.
- Extra cost depends on baseline.
Core trade-offs
Defence suppliers and capability gain from higher spending. The cost falls on taxpayers or other services, and supply constraints can raise procurement prices.
- Defence capability and suppliers gain.
- Taxpayers or other departments fund it.
- Procurement bottlenecks can waste money.
Illustrative fiscal impact
+GBP 4.0bn to +GBP 18.0bn. Central estimate: +GBP 10.0bn.
- Positive numbers mean public-finance pressure; negative numbers mean Exchequer savings.
- 3% GDP target is the main scale marker.
- Gross costs and receipt offsets are separated in methodology.
- Behaviour and pass-through widen the range.
- This is not an official costing.
Economic impact by 2029-30
- Jobs: Supports defence manufacturing and military jobs, but draws resources from elsewhere.
- Wages: Specialist defence and engineering wages may rise in constrained supply chains.
- Prices: Procurement inflation likely if capacity is limited.
- GDP / productivity: Short-run demand rises; productivity gains depend on procurement quality and spillovers.
Assessment
Higher defence spending may be justified on security grounds, but it is a real fiscal choice. The target is expensive relative to the current 2.5% path and can be wasteful if procurement capacity, industrial strategy and personnel plans are weak. The GDP effect is not automatically positive.
Confidence: Medium. GDP-share targets are clear, but future GDP, NATO definitions and procurement capacity create uncertainty.
Main risks
- Procurement inflation: Rapid increases can raise prices when shipyards, munitions and skilled labour are constrained.
- Crowding out: Funding defence may require lower civil spending, higher taxes or borrowing.
- Target gaming: GDP-share targets can encourage spending to hit the metric rather than value.
Safeguards
- Publish a costed equipment and personnel plan.
- Phase spending through audited procurement gates.
- Separate NATO-definition spending from broader security spending.
Academic evidence
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2012
Fiscal multipliers vary
Government-spending multipliers are larger in downturns and smaller in expansions.
Relevant to GDP effects from higher defence procurement.
Ramey, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011
Government spending shocks
Spending shocks can have moderate output multipliers and can crowd out consumption or private activity.
Supports caution that defence spending is not a free growth policy.
UK government evidence
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026
Public finances overview
The OBR expects public receipts of about GBP 1,235bn in 2025-26.
Scale check for large packages.
Reform UK, 2024
Reform spending claims
The Contract claims large savings from departments, QE reserves, aid, welfare and net zero.
Defines scenarios but needs caution.
Sources
- PolicyLens illustrative scenario methodology: Raise defence spending to 3% of GDP Internal - PolicyLens, 2026
- Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy Academic article - Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2012
- Identifying Government Spending Shocks Academic article - Ramey, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011
- A brief guide to the public finances Fiscal forecast - Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026
- Our Contract with You Party policy document - Reform UK, 2024
- UK defence spending Parliamentary briefing - House of Commons Library, 2025
- Strategic Defence Review 2025 UK government report - Ministry of Defence, 2025
- Our Policies Party policy source - Reform UK, 2026
Other Reform UK policies
PolicyLens estimates are illustrative and not official costings.