Build 150,000 social homes yearly: note

Central fiscal result

+£6.2bn - Net fiscal impact in 2028-29

Low case: +£3.0bn. High case: +£14.0bn. Positive numbers are fiscal costs or borrowing pressure. Negative numbers are Exchequer savings or receipts.

Scenario and baseline

• Models build 150,000 social homes yearly by 2028-29.
• Baseline is current policy or published departmental plans.
• Central case uses published party or official anchors where available.
• Wider manifesto interactions are excluded unless stated.

Affected population

• Affected units are people, firms, households or providers depending on policy.
• Direct exposure follows the manifesto or government target group.
• Indirect exposure includes suppliers, workers, consumers and taxpayers.
• Weakest counts are widened in the low and high cases.

Gross impact

• Published anchor or scenario central is +£6.2bn in 2028-29.
• Gross costs or receipts are adjusted for behaviour and delivery risk.
• Tax, benefit or procurement offsets are separated in the fiscal build-up.
• The range is deliberately wider where implementation detail is thin.

Fiscal build-up, central case

• Gross programme or delivery cost: +£7.1bn
• Tax and receipt offsets: -£0.5bn
• Administration and evaluation: +£0.1bn
• Behavioural and pass-through effects: -£0.5bn

Central net impact: +£6.2bn in 2028-29.

Behaviour and pass-through

• Low case assumes stronger delivery or receipts than central.
• Central case applies moderate behavioural leakage and pass-through.
• High case allows weaker delivery, larger take-up or higher costs.
• Output effects follow incidence, capacity and investment channels.
• Distributional gains do not automatically imply GDP gains.

Phasing

• 2026-27: +£0.6bn. Phased implementation and take-up.
• 2027-28: +£3.4bn. Phased implementation and take-up.
• 2028-29: +£6.2bn. Phased implementation and take-up.
• 2029-30: +£6.2bn. Phased implementation and take-up.

Main source groups

• Glaeser and Gyourko, "The Economic Implications of Housing Supply" (Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2018): Constrained housing supply raises prices and can damage mobility and productivity; explains why supply reform can raise GDP.
• Hilber and Vermeulen, "The Impact of Supply Constraints on House Prices" (Economic Journal, 2016): Tight planning constraints raise house prices and limit the effect of demand-side policy; supports planning and housing-supply analysis.
• Liberal Democrats, "Funding a Fair Deal: Liberal Democrat Manifesto Costings" (2024): Party costings give 2028-29 spending, revenue and investment figures; used as starting anchors, not official costings.
• Office for National Statistics, "Housing supply indicators, UK" (2025): ONS housing indicators show supply constraints and market pressures; used for housing baseline context.
• Liberal Democrats, "For a Fair Deal: Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2024" (2024): The manifesto gives announced policy detail across health, care, housing, taxes and climate; used to define the policy scenarios.