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Methodology note

Cap foreign aid at £1bn: calculation note

Assumptions behind the Cap foreign aid at £1bn scenario. Implementation detail is incomplete, so uncertainty is explicit.

View main policy page: Cap foreign aid at £1bn

Central fiscal result

-£6.5bn - Net fiscal impact in 2027-28

Low case: -£10.0bn. High case: -£3.0bn. Positive numbers are fiscal costs or borrowing pressure. Negative numbers are Exchequer savings or receipts.

Scenario and baseline

  • UK ODA is capped at £1bn annually.
  • The baseline reflects the planned move toward 0.3% of GNI.
  • Unspecified exceptions are not assumed centrally.
  • No replacement security or refugee fund is included.

Affected population

  • Affected units are aid programmes, recipients and UK suppliers.
  • FCDO and multilateral programmes face the largest cuts.
  • Domestic aid contractors and charities lose work.
  • UK taxpayers receive the saving.

Gross impact

  • 2025 provisional ODA was £13.0bn.
  • A £1bn cap implies very large cuts before baseline adjustment.
  • Central saving is £6.5bn in 2027-28.
  • Low saving assumes broad exemptions and existing cuts.

Fiscal build-up, central case

  • ODA programme savings: -£7.5bn
  • Contract exit and transition costs: +£0.5bn
  • Replacement diplomatic/security spending: +£0.5bn
  • Administration and uncertainty: +£0.0bn

Central net impact: -£6.5bn in 2027-28.

Behaviour and pass-through

  • Low saving case assumes aid baseline has already fallen sharply.
  • Central case assumes most programmes are cut but obligations remain.
  • High saving case assumes few exemptions and rapid cancellation.
  • Macroeconomic effects are mostly outside UK GDP.

Phasing

  • 2026-27: -£3.0bn. Preparation or partial implementation.
  • 2027-28: -£6.5bn. Main scenario year.
  • 2028-29: -£7.0bn. Behaviour and pass-through develop.
  • 2029-30: -£7.5bn. Steady-state uncertainty persists.

Main source groups

  • Office for Budget Responsibility, "A brief guide to the public finances" (2026): The OBR expects public receipts of about £1,235bn in 2025-26; scale check for large packages.
  • Reform UK, "Our Contract with You" (2024): The Contract claims large savings from departments, QE reserves, aid, welfare and net zero; defines scenarios but needs caution.
  • FCDO, "Provisional UK aid spend 2025" (2026): Used to size the affected population, baseline economic quantities and sectoral exposure.
  • Rajan and Subramanian, "Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?" (Review of Economics and Statistics, 2008): Cross-country evidence found little robust positive or negative link between aid and recipient-country growth; supports caution about claiming automatic development returns from aid spending.
  • Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani and Bazzi, "Counting Chickens when they Hatch: Timing and the Effects of Aid on Growth" (Economic Journal, 2012): Re-analysis found that aid increases were followed by investment and growth when timing was handled differently; shows the evidence is mixed, not uniformly anti-aid.
  • Reform UK, "Our Policies" (2026): Used to define the pledge wording, policy scope and implementation scenario being modelled.