Methodology note
Cut crypto CGT to 10%: calculation note
Assumptions behind the Cut crypto CGT to 10% scenario. Implementation detail is incomplete, so uncertainty is explicit.
Central fiscal result
+£0.5bn - Net fiscal impact in 2027-28
Low case: -£1.0bn. High case: +£5.0bn. Positive numbers are fiscal costs or borrowing pressure. Negative numbers are Exchequer savings or receipts.
Scenario and baseline
- Crypto capital gains are taxed at 10%.
- A two-year sandbox and banking access rules are introduced.
- Tax payments in crypto are operationally enabled.
- Bitcoin reserve size is unspecified and not central.
Affected population
- Affected units are crypto investors, exchanges, banks and HMRC.
- Reform says about 7m UK residents hold crypto.
- High-income investors likely account for much taxable gain.
- Tax administrators face valuation and compliance risks.
Gross impact
- Central case assumes lower CGT loses more than compliance gains.
- Low case assumes declarations and onshore activity increase receipts.
- High case includes reserve losses or large tax-base erosion.
- Sandbox administration is small.
Fiscal build-up, central case
- Crypto CGT rate cut: +£0.8bn
- Higher declarations and activity: -£0.3bn
- Regulation and HMRC systems: +£0.1bn
- Bitcoin reserve central effect: -£0.1bn
Central net impact: +£0.5bn in 2027-28.
Behaviour and pass-through
- Low case assumes lower rates bring gains onshore and improve compliance.
- Central case assumes modest compliance gain and some revenue loss.
- High case assumes tax-base erosion and adverse reserve valuation.
- Crypto volatility dominates short-run receipts.
Phasing
- 2026-27: +£0.2bn. Preparation or partial implementation.
- 2027-28: +£0.5bn. Main scenario year.
- 2028-29: +£0.8bn. Behaviour and pass-through develop.
- 2029-30: +£0.8bn. Steady-state uncertainty persists.
Main source groups
- Halaburda, Haeringer, Gans and Gandal, "The Microeconomics of Cryptocurrencies" (Journal of Economic Literature, 2022): The literature emphasises volatility, network effects, mining incentives and limited fundamental anchors in crypto markets; supports high uncertainty around tax-base and reserve-risk assumptions.
- Gandal and Halaburda, "Network effects in digital assets" (Games, 2016): Digital-currency competition depends on network effects and expectations, not only statutory tax treatment; warns against assuming tax cuts alone create a crypto hub.
- Reform UK, "Digital Assets and Cryptocurrency Bill" (2025): The bill proposes 10% crypto CGT, a sandbox, banking access, tax payment in crypto and a Bitcoin reserve; defines the modelled package.
- HM Revenue and Customs, "Direct effects of illustrative tax changes" (2026): HMRC ready-reckoners show capital-gains-tax responses can be non-linear and behaviour-sensitive; supports a wide range.
- Budish, "Trust at Scale: The Economic Limits of Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains" (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2025): Proof-of-work blockchain security has economic limits linked to attack incentives and resource costs; relevant to treating a public bitcoin reserve as risky, not neutral.
- Reform UK, "Our Policies" (2026): Used to define the pledge wording, policy scope and implementation scenario being modelled.