Methodology note
Tighten benefit job-offer rules: calculation note
Assumptions behind the Tighten benefit job-offer rules scenario. Implementation detail is incomplete, so uncertainty is explicit.
Central fiscal result
-GBP 5.0bn - Net fiscal impact in 2027-28
Low case: -GBP 15.0bn. High case: +GBP 5.0bn. Positive numbers are fiscal costs or borrowing pressure. Negative numbers are Exchequer savings or receipts.
Scenario and baseline
- Two refused job offers lead to benefit withdrawal.
- Applies only to claimants judged fit for work.
- Reform's two-million returner claim is not assumed centrally.
- Child and disability protections are unspecified.
Affected population
- Affected units are working-age benefit claimants and households.
- Central exposure is below the two-million political claim.
- Employers may see more low-wage applicants.
- Local labour markets face uneven effects.
Gross impact
- Central saving assumes fewer claims and some employment.
- Tax gains are modest because many jobs are low-paid.
- Hardship and appeal costs reduce net savings.
- High case allows savings to disappear.
Fiscal build-up, central case
- Benefit payments reduced: -GBP 7.5bn
- Extra income-tax and NI receipts: -GBP 1.0bn
- Employment support and appeals: +GBP 1.5bn
- Hardship and local-service costs: +GBP 2.0bn
Central net impact: -GBP 5.0bn in 2027-28.
Behaviour and pass-through
- Low case assumes stronger genuine employment gains and lower repeat claims.
- Central case assumes many exits do not become stable work.
- High case assumes appeals, hardship and poor matches offset savings.
- GDP gains are not counted without evidence of sustained earnings.
Phasing
- 2026-27: +GBP 0.0bn. Preparation or partial implementation.
- 2027-28: -GBP 5.0bn. Main scenario year.
- 2028-29: -GBP 6.0bn. Behaviour and pass-through develop.
- 2029-30: -GBP 6.0bn. Steady-state uncertainty persists.
Main source groups
- S1: Reform Contract defines the two-strike rule and two-million claim.
- S2: IFS warns welfare savings lack implementation detail.
- S3: DWP sanctions data would be needed for affected caseloads.
- S4: Labour-market evidence cautions against mechanical work-entry assumptions.
- S5: Health and disability exemptions remain unspecified.
- S6: Unemployment-insurance and labour-market-programme studies inform job-search assumptions.